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This paper studies the impact of trade liberalization on labor and capital gross flows and 
productivity in the Uruguayan Manufacturing Sector. Uruguay opened its economy in the 
presence of strong –at least initially- unions and structural different industry concentration 
levels. Higher international exposure implied a slightly higher job creation and an important 
increase in job and capital destruction. Unions were able to ameliorate this effect. Although not 
associated with higher creation rates, unions were effective in reducing job and capital 
destruction. Industry concentration also was found to mitigate the destruction of jobs but had no 
effect on job creation nor in capital dynamics. The changes in the use of labor and capital 
brought an increase in total factor productivity specially in sectors where tariff reductions were 
larger and unions were not present. We found no evidence of varying productivity dynamics 
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The development strategy of the Uruguayan economy evolved from inward looking, 
based on state interventionism and import substitution protectionist policies, towards an 
outward looking orientation, with more reliance on markets as resource allocation 
mechanisms and exports as the growth engine. This change started in the seventies, 
when a first phase of trade reform took place accompanied by a quick financial 
liberalization process. During the nineties, a second phase of trade liberalization took 
place. This phase combined a deepened gradual unilateral tariff reduction with the 
creation of Mercosur, an imperfect customs union between Argentina, Brazil  and 
Paraguay and Uruguay 
 
The trade liberalization had two distinctive characteristics. First, it took place in a 
context in which unions still maintained significant power, and in many cases such 
changes were negotiated with them. Second, the manufacturing industry in Uruguay 
was in the mid-eighties basically composed of a reduced number of traditional-products 
exporting firms and by sectors developed under the import substitution process. Most 
industries showed high concentration levels. This gave firms considerable market 
power, that allowed them to set prices substantially above marginal costs (see Laens, 
Noya and Casares, (1985)). 
 
This paper focuses on the impact of trade liberalization on productivity dynamics and 
the creation and destruction of jobs and capital. We examine how this impact varies 
with the strength of unions and the level of concentration across industries.  
 
Several papers addressed the effects of trade liberalization on employment, capital and 
productivity dynamics. In the empirical literature, three basic strategies were followed. 
The first one is through cross country comparisons (Ben David (1993), Sachs and 
Warner (1995). The second is through sector-level analysis (Keller (2000), Kim   
(2000)). This second approach is not subject to criticism on the arbitrariness of the 
openness measures and of potential endogeneity problems that the first approach raised 
but it can not capture micro-level effects. This paper is part of a third approach that uses 
establishment level panel data to address the effects of higher international trade 
exposure (see for example Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992), Tybout (2001), Aw 
Chen and Roberts (1997), Levinsohn (1999), López-Cordoba (2002), Muendler (2002) 
and Pavcnik (2002)). 
 
Muendler (2002) using a panel of Brazilian firms, analyses the relationship between 
trade openness and productivity. He identifies three channels by which trade reform 
may affect productivity. In this paper we refer to these tree channels and expand on their 
effects on factor flows.  
 
The first, called the foreign input push, is the process by which in a more open economy 
firms have access to a higher quality or a cheaper pool of intermediate inputs and capital 
goods in foreign markets, that allow them to adopt new production methods and 
substitute other relatively more expensive factors of production. This implies therefore 










push in which increased competition in the product market may lead to innovation and 
removal of agency problems. Hence productivity gains are to be expected. With respect 
to factor flows there are two extreme cases. On one hand, that in which higher 
productivity is passed on in higher factor payments with factor quantities fixed, and in 
the other hand, that in which we observe both capital and job creation. There is a third 
channel observed only at the sector level which is termed competitive elimination: 
increased foreign competition forces the least efficient firms to close down while the 
more efficient ones gain market share, hence raising average productivity. The capital 
and jobs of exiting firms are destroyed.  
 
Although there is agreement in the literature on the wage effects of unions
2, the results 
on the non wage dimensions are less robust in particular in what respect to employment 
growth, investment and productivity. On a theoretical basis three aspects of union 
behavior can be differentiated: monopoly costs, participatory benefits and rent seeking 
activities. On the monopoly costs Rees (1963) points that the increased in the wage on 
unionized workers induces substitution for non unionized workers. This argument can 
be extended to substitution of labor for other factors of production, e.g. capital. 
McDonald and Solow (1981) show that this effects is mitigated when the negotiations 
are over both wages and employment. Moreover, since unionized firms share their 
profits with the union, this creates a hold up problem that may induce lower investment 
(Grout (1984)). The second theoretical aspect associated with the “organizational view” 
of unions (Freeman (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1979, 1984)), stresses their 
economic benefits. The unions acting as a "collective voice" may be effective in 
transmitting worker preferences to the management and can participate in establishing 
seniority provisions that reduce rivalry between workers with different levels of 
experience. This effect reduces job turnover and increases the incentives to give 
informal on the job training. In Malcomson (1983) unions may help to enforce contracts 
between workers and managers. More generally, in this view unions can induce better 
practices in the part of the managment (reduce the so called X-inefficiency). Thirdly, 
considering unions as rent seekers, Pencavel (1995) point out that on a general basis 
unions push for lower competition in labor and product markets. In the latter ones 
unions interests are in line with firms' interest
3 but they disagree with respect to market 
labor regulations.  
 
Which of all those theoretical effects dominates is an empirical matter. Most studies 
conclude that unionized sectors tend to grow at a lower rate (for instance see Boal and 
Pencavel (1994), Freman and Kleiner (1990) and Standing (1992)). Also, there is no 
agreement on the empirical effect of unions on productivity. For instance, Brunello 
(1992) finds unions to be associated with lower productivity while the opposite was find 
by Standing (1992). The results of Hirsh (1990) and Denny and Nickell (1991) suggest 
that unionized firms underinvest.  
 
With respect to concentration, Borjas and Ramey (1995) present a model in which the 
impact of trade liberalization on wages and employment will be smaller the more 
competitive an industry.  
                                                            
2 On his survey on the effects of unionization Kuhn (1998) states that unions raise wages by about 15%  
according to empirical studies on USA and Canada. Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) report the results of other 
studies including less developed countries that are consistent with a positive wage differential between 
unionized and non unionized workers (Park (1991) and Butcher and Rouse (2001)). 











Our paper contributes to the existent literature in three ways: i) presents evidence on the 
direct effects of trade liberalization on job, capital and productivity dynamics for a less 
developed country, ii) presents evidence on the mitigating or enhancing effects of 
unions and industry concentration on the job, capital and productivity dynamics 
produced by an increase in international exposure, iii) presents evidence on how these 
effects vary for blue and white collar workers.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: section two presents  an overview of the Uruguayan 
trade liberalization and previous relevant work on the Uruguayan case; section three 
describes the data; section four the statistics on labor and capital dynamics and 
productivity; section five presents the estimates of the impact of trade liberalization on 
employement, capital and productivity dynamics and how this varies over union density 
and industry concentration. Finally, section six concludes.  
 
 
II.  Trade Liberalization, Unions and Industry Concentration in Uruguay 
 
Although Uruguay started to open its economy in the seventies, in the nineties the 
process was intensified, along with the signature of the Mercosur treaty with Argentina 
Brazil and Paraguay. As a result, flows from and to these countries increased their share 
in Uruguay’s trade. In addition, a stabilization program based on an exchange rate 
anchor was undertaken. This policy considerably reduced inflation –which had climbed 
to three digits figures at the beginning of the decade- to an annual rate of around 42% in 
1995, but it was simultaneously accompanied by a significant real appreciation of the 
peso, especially vis a vis non Mercosur countries. Concurrently, firms in the 
manufacturing sector were strongly affected and, in order to remain competitive, had to 
undergo a process of technological and organizational update.  
 
The trade liberalization process in Uruguay is described in Vaillant (2000) as going 
through different phases during our period of analysis. From 1988 to 1994, this author 
finds that trade policy sought to continue and deepen the openness process started in the 
seventies, intended to end the anti export bias that characterized previous import 
substitution policies. With the recovery of democratic institutions in 1984, political 
pressure for the modification of trade policy grew, but the government did not modify 
the main policies. There was only a slightly higher protection as a result of increased 
use of non tariff barriers. In 1991, with the signature of the Mercosur treaty a program 
of scheduled tariffs reductions began that ended in 1995 with the establishment of an 
imperfect trade union. 
 
Vaillant (2000) points to a modification in the political economy of the trade policy 
setting process in Uruguay. After 1958, the trade policy was regulated mostly by 
Presidential decrees rather than Parliament-approved laws. The main organized lobby 
groups were the pro-openness exporters and the pro-protection import competing 
sectors. The early stages of the reforms were carried on with a significant ability on the 











The most important change in the nineties was that, through the signing of binding 
international treaties (Mercosur and World Trade Organization), the government 
significantly curtailed its ability to provide discretionary protection to specific sectors. 
At any rate, the tailored made protection was for most cases introduced trough non tariff 
instruments. Therefore - despite we recognize the existence of a vast literature on the 
endogeneity of trade policy - this motivates the treatment of tariff reductions as an 
exogenous stimulus to firms and sectors. Moreover we claim that given the relative 
bargaining weights of Mercosur partners, the endogeneity of the common external tariff 
is likely a problem for studies of Argentina and fundamentally Brazil but not Paraguay 
and Uruguay. Again, this does not mean that protectionist policies in Uruguay are 
exogenous, but since they were channeled trough non tariff barriers the changes in the 
exchange rate can be treated as exogenous.  
 
Table 1 shows the evolution in Uruguayan import tariffs for raw materials, three types 
of intermediate goods and final goods. The progressive simplification and lower 
protection levels of the regime are evident in the table. Table 2, in turn, shows how the 
share of Uruguayan intra-Mercosur trade increased over the whole period. This is the 
result of the block liberalization strategy followed by Uruguay.  
 
Table 1. Custom Global Tax Structure (1982-1995) 
                                   
   Since: 
   Jan. 82  Jan. 83 Jun. 85 Aug. 86 Aug. 87 Jun. 89 Apr. 90 Sep. 91 Apr. 92 Jan. 93 Jan. 95 
Raw Materials  10-15%  10% 15% 10% 10% 10% 15% 10% 10%  6%    0-14% 
Intermediate Goods (1)    25-35%  20% 25% 20% 20% 20% 25%           
Intermediate Goods (2)    45-55%  35% 40% 35% 30% 30% 35% 20% 17% 15%  0-20% 
Intermediate Goods (3)  65% 45% 50% 45% 40% 35% 35%           
Final Goods  75% 55% 60% 50% 45% 40% 40% 30% 24% 20%  0-20% 
Note: Intermediate goods were classified in three different categories. Source: Vaillant (2000) 
 
Table 2. Uruguayan Intra-Mercosur Trade in Total Trade 
 
   Exports  Imports 
1982  25% 20% 
1983  20% 24% 
1984  22% 28% 
1985  24% 30% 
1986  35% 39% 
1987  27% 38% 
1988  23% 41% 
1989  33% 41% 
1990  35% 40% 
1991  36% 41% 
1992  37% 58% 
1993  42% 48% 
1994  46% 49% 
1995  47% 46% 











Several authors have analyzed the relation between productivity and trade policy in 
manufacturing in Uruguay. Tansini and Triunfo (1999) estimate a stochastic frontier 
production function and compute a measure of the distance between each 
establishment’s production choice and the best practice frontier. They found efficiency 
to be positively associated with foreign ownership of firms, import penetration and, 
somewhat surprisingly, negatively with the exporter status of firms. Arimón and Torello 
(1997) estimate total factor productivity (TFP) by index numbers methods for the 1982-
1992 period, for manufacturing 4 digit ISIC sectors. They conclude that increases in 
TFP are observed in those sectors more strongly affected by foreign competition, 
moderately exporting and import competing sectors. 
 
Protection and unions are related in Rama (1994). The main finding is that from 1978 to 
1986, there is no significant effect of tariffs in wage levels, though there is an 
employment effect. In a previous paper, Rama (1992) presents cross sectional 
regressions of affiliation rates by industry on market power related variables 
(concentration, effective protection). 
 
Different institutional settings characterized the labor market during the eighties and 
nineties. Following the loss of democracy and until 1984 unions were banned. After 
that, with the democratic recovery in 1985 and until 1991, there was tripartite (worker, 
entrepreneur and government representatives) wage bargaining at the industry level with 
mandatory extension to all firms within the sector. The centralization level was mainly 
identified to be at 4 or 5 digit ISIC industries, though this is not uniform across sectors.  
 
Forteza (1991) argues that the objective of the government's involvement in these 
negotiations was to mitigate the inflationary process. In any case, the government's 
attempts to influence expectations of future inflation were not credible. Wages observed 
at the firm level tended to follow or even to exceed the negotiated wage levels. From 
1991 onwards, the government stepped out of negotiations, coincident with the 
implementation of an exchange rate based stabilization program. This radically changed 
the entrepreneurs and unions incentives to participate in sectoral negotiations. After 
1992, negotiations carried out at the firm or group of firms level were an increasing 
proportion of all agreements registered at the Ministry of Labor, and in 1996-1997 they 
clearly become the majority (64% according to Rodriguez et al.(1998)). Figure 1 
































There was also a change in the scope and objectives of negotiations. Cassoni and 
Labadie (2001) show that wage negotiations dominate in the years prior to 1991. Hence 
they argue that a plausible model for wage and employment determination was a ‘right 
to manage’ model, in which wages are first agreed between unions and employers, with 
firms subsequently determining employment. Since 1993, they observe that clauses 
concerning employment start to be added to the agreements. Hence the appropriate 
framework seems to be an ‘efficient contract’ model in which firms and unions bargain 
over both wages and employment. 
 
Finally, with respect to concentration there is not a clear pattern of concentration or de-
concentration over the period but there are structural differences across industries. 
Figure 2 presents the average industry concentration over the whole period -measured as 


















This study is based on annual establishment level observations from the Manufacturing 
Survey conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) for the period 1982-
1995. The survey-sampling frame encompasses all Uruguayan manufacturing 
establishments with five or more employees.  
 
The INE divided each four-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
sector in two groups. All establishments with more than 100 employees were  included 
in the survey; the random sampling process of firms with less than 100 employees  
satisfies the criterion that the total employment of all the selected establishments must 
account at least for 60% of the total employment of the sector according to the 
economic Census (1978 or 1988).
4 This selection criteria makes our database biased 
towards large firms. 
 
Although the survey is basically establishment-based, it is not equivalent to databases 
used in previous plant level studies (Dune et al. (1989), Baldwin (1996) and Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992)). Our data enables us to distinguish plants of the same firm in 
different industries -five digit ISIC-, but we cannot distinguish between plants of the 
same firm in the same sector, which are all computed as one establishment.  
 
The data for the whole period are actually obtained from two sub sample sets: from 
                                                            
4 For a detailed discussion see INE (1996). 
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1982 until 1988 and from 1988 until 1995. In 1988 the Second National Economic 
Census was conducted. After that, the INE made a major methodological revision to the 
manufacturing survey and changed the sample of establishments.  
 
In 1988, the Census year, information was collected for both the old and the new 
samples. A subset of the establishments of the old sample were also included in the new 
one, while others do not continue and others not previously surveyed were inducted into 
the sample.  
 
In total we have 1283 different establishments present in at least one period. There are 
574 starting in 1982, of which just 240 make it to 1995. The 1988 sample is composed 
of 601 establishments included for the first time in that year and 573 from the old 
sample that not old are to be followed in subsequent years. Table 3 displays the number 






























Entry and Exit 
 
Due to death of firms, the INE periodically revises the sample coverage and if necessary 
includes new firms. Once a firm enters into the survey, it is supposed to be followed 










interpret this as a plant closure (exit). However, we can not distinguish which of the 
establishments that exit the sample in 1988 do so because they ceased their activity, and 
which only were dropped out of the sample. In our empirical work we assumed that in 
1988 all firms that do not continue in 1989 were taken out of the sample and therefore 
we register no deaths in that year.  
 
There are additional difficulties concerning entry. As mentioned, the INE periodically 
includes new establishments, but these do not necessarily belong to newborn firms. The 
survey does not report the age of establishments, but the firm’s date of birth is reported 
in most (but not all cases) in the Economic Census. We complement the survey with the 
Census data and construct an age variable. By definition it is not available for 
establishments in the 1982-1988 subsample that do not survive until the census year. 
Newborn entrants before 1988 can be identified from the Census. Whenever after 1988 
we found a new establishment in the data set that was not included in the Census, we 
asked the INE to specify if the establishment was really a newborn and some 
information about starting dates was added. However, our data show no newborn 





The weights are based on employment and/or capital stock sample proportions by three 
digit ISIC sector. In the case of capital, we calculate the total capital stock in the sample 




j respectively), and compute the capital weight associated 
to establishments belonging to sector j as w
K




j. In the case of employment, 
we calculate the total employment in the sample and in the census by sector and size 




js respectively) and compute 
the employment weight associated to establishments belonging to industry j and class 
size  s as w
E










Our database allows us to construct three different types of capital variables: machinery, 
buildings and other capital assets. However, due to differences in the criteria utilized by 
reporting firms, especially with respect to building investment and its depreciation, we 
are not confident of the accuracy of this variable and report results only for total capital, 
machinery and other capital. 
 
The Manufacturing Survey does not directly report capital. In order to construct an 
establishment capital series, we follow a methodology closely related to the one 
proposed by Black and Lynch (1997).  Due to data limitations this is done only for the 
period 1988-1995.  
 
Although the 1988 Census reports information on the capital stock, there have been 
various unsuccessful attempts to calculate a time series using that initial capital together 










success are probably linked to the accounting policies of firms. We avoid 
overestimation of the amount of depreciation by calculating an average depreciation rate 
by type of asset – building, machinery and others – by industrial sector and by year. The 
resulting depreciation rate is then used for all firms within each sector yearly. We 
further exclude the value of assets sold in our measure of capital, assuming assets have 





























where i indexes firms; j the industrial sector, t the year and x stands for: machinery, 
buildings or other capital assets. As generally noted in papers on the subject, K is the 





In order to express all variables in constant pesos we need to use several price indexes. 
Gross output is deflated using the wholesale price index computed by the INE. 
Intermediate consumption is the sum of material inputs, production performed by third 
parties, rents, fuel, electricity and others. For electricity we use an Electricity Price 
Index computed by the INE, for material inputs and fuel we use two different specific 
price indexes constructed by Picardo and Ferre (2003) based on INE data. The rest of 
the components are deflated by the wholesale price index. Value added at constant 
prices is computed as the difference between real gross output and intermediate 
consumption. Finally, in order to deflate investment and capital we use a specific price 




IV.  Employment, Capital and Productivity Dynamics 
 
IV.1.  Job and Capital Flows 
 
The goal of this section is to summarize the facts regarding the creation, destruction and 
reallocation of two categories of jobs and capital. The definitions follow Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Shuh (1996). The measure of size for 
establishment i at time t, is the simple average of employment in periods t and t-1, 
[] 2 / 1 − + = it it it E E φ . In order to facilitate comparison of our results with other studies in 
the area, the rate of growth of employment is defined as has become the norm of the 
literature as  [] it it it it E E Net φ / 1 − − =  where  it E  is total employment of establishment i at 










and other capital are analogous).  This growth rate varies from –2 to 2. Using these 
definitions aggregate net job creation, job reallocation, job creation, and job destruction 




it it t Net Net φ  
∑ =
i
it it t Net Sum φ  
() ∑ =
i
it it t Net Pos 0 , max φ  
() ∑ =
i
it it t Net Neg 0 , min φ  
 
Net creation is the change in total employment, job creation is the sum of all newly 
created jobs in the sample, job destruction is the sum of all destructed jobs. Job 
reallocation summarizes the heterogeneity in plant level employment outputs, by adding 
the number of jobs that were destroyed and created in the period. Note that from these 
definitions Nett=Post - Negt and Sumt=Post + Negt 
 
Over the fourteen years covered in this study there was a net job contraction of 4.5%. 
Annual gross job flow rates vary considerably over time. Job creation rates vary 
between 4% and 11% while job destruction rates vary between 5% and 17%. Job net 
creation and job reallocation rates vary between –12% and 3% and between 12% and 
22%  respectively (see Table 4 and Figure 3).
5 Capital creation and destruction rates are 
more stable ranging from 6% to 13% and from 7% to 14% respectively. 
Table 4. Jobs and Capital flow rates 
 
     
Total 
Employment  White Collar  Blue Collar  Total Capital   Machinery  Other Capital 
1983-1987 Net creation  -0,4%  -2,3%  0,4%         
   Reallocation  14,5%  12,6%  16,1%         
   Creation  7,1%  5,2%  8,3%         
   Destruction  7,5%  7,5%  7,8%         
1988-1995 Net creation  -7,1% -5,4% -7,4% -3,3% -0,2% -1,7% 
   Reallocation  18,9% 20,8% 20,8% 11,2% 19,1% 17,5% 
   Creation  5,9% 7,7% 6,7% 4,0% 9,5% 7,9% 
   Destruction  13,0% 13,1% 14,1%  7,2%  9,6%  9,6% 
1982-1995 Net creation  -4,5% -4,1% -4,4%         
   Reallocation  17,2%  17,6%  19,0%         
   Creation  6,4%  6,7%  7,3%         








                                                            
5 Figure 3 presents our net creation statistics based on weighting our micro data, and the net creation that 
results from the aggregate statistics published by the INE (in the national statistics, the year 1988 net 
creation is not included since the published data for 1987 and 1988 coming from different samples are not 
comparable). 









































































In 1983 Uruguayan firms were still suffering the effects of the sudden change in the 
exchange rate policy that occurred in November of 1982. Manufacturing output fell by 
22% in 1981-1983. This process was naturally accompanied by a significant net job 
destruction. After that, over the rest of the eighties it is possible to observe an increase 
in jobs. It was during the nineties, when the government abandoned the role it played in 
previous years in the bargaining process and when the process of trade barrier reduction 
was stronger that most of the destruction took place.  
 
Over the entire period the rate of net destruction is approximately equal for white and 
blue collar jobs, although it is slightly stronger for the latter than the former. This 
general result for the whole period hides a different evolution over time. While during 
the economic recovery from 1984 onwards, creation was higher in less qualified jobs, 
blue collar jobs suffered higher destruction rates over the nineties. This is in line with 
the view that the recovery during the second half of the eighties in Uruguay is explained 
by the increased use of existent previously idle capacity and not the introduction of new 
capital or technologies.  
 
Between 1988-1995, capital experienced a negative net creation both in its total and in 
its components that contrasts with the much higher net destruction of employment on 
that period. While there was continuous net destruction of employment in the nineties 
(both for white and blue collar jobs but especially for the latter), in 1994 and 1995 there 




























was positive net creation of capital (see Figures 3 and 4). This is indicative of 
technological change towards a more capital intensive production function.  
 
 
IV.2. Productivity   
 
In this section we lay the main stylized facts of productivity estimates for our panel of 
firms. We present both employment and capital average productivity measures 
(output/employment and output/capital ratios) and a measure of total factor productivity 
estimated econometrically by two different methodologies. 
 
Labor and capital average productivity are defined as the ratio between firm value 
added and the amount of each factor of production used in the period:  
 
 
         
 




Aggregate factor productivity is then a weighted average of establishment level 
productivities. Letting the share of firm i employment in total employment be 
t it
E
it E E / = φ  (and similarly for capital), aggregate factor productivity is defined by: 
 
        
 
We have also estimated the establishment level total factor productivity using the 
methodologies proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinshon and Petrin (2000) 
(OP and LP onwards). The details of both methodologies are summarized in the 
appendix. Both are essentially methods for estimating the parameters of an underlying 
production function that provide a remedy for two main problems associated with these 
estimates. These are the selection problem (i.e. in a panel a researcher would only 
observe the surviving firms, hence those likely to be the most productive), and the 
simultaneity problem (the input choices of firms conditional on the fact that they 
continue to be in activity depend on their productivity). 
 
In Table 5 we display the coefficients of a production function estimated by OP and LP 
methodologies. Since LP uses electricity to proxy for unobservables rather than 
investment (as OP), there is about the triple of observation in LP than in OP.  
 
Table 5.  
Production function estimations 
   Olley-Pakes  Levinsohn-
Petrin 
Unskilled labor  0.350 0,132 
   (0.032)*** (0,040) 
Skilled labor  0.317 0,367 
                                                            
6 We also explored defining productivity using gross production. Given that the accounting problems in 
the building capital variable translate to total capital, capital productivity refers to machinery capital 
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   (0.024)*** (0,029) 
Materials  0.295 0,254 
   (0.017)*** (0,024) 
Electricity   0,122 
    (0,042) 
Capital stock  0.250 0,135 
   (0.045)*** (0,028) 
Observations. 1436  4120 
Standard errors in parenthesis   
 
Aggregate total factor productivity is then a weighted average of establishment total 
factor productivity. Letting the share of firm i output be  t it
Y
it Y Y / = φ , aggregate total 
factor productivity is defined by: 
 
     
 
Table 6 shows the estimated productivity growth rates. Over the whole period, 
employment productivity grew at an average annual rate of 2.4%. But again the 
existence of two differentiated periods should be noted: from 1982 until 1988 and from 
that year until 1995. In the first period we observe a low annual growth rate of 0.9% in 
labor productivity that is more than compensated by a productivity boom mostly 
occurring in the nineties. From 1988 until 1995 total employment productivity grew at 
an annual 3.7% rate. The net creation rates presented in the previous section document 
the increase in the capital to labor ratio. This more abundant use of capital translates 
into a –2.6% average annual growth rate for capital productivity.  
 
Total factor productivity also grew at a very high rate, 3.3% according to the OP 
methodology and 3.7% according to the LP.  
 
Table 6.  Average Annual productivity growth rates 
 
 Employment  Capital  TFP  TFP 
 Productivity  Productivity  Olley-Pakes  Levinshon-Petrin 
1982-1987  0,9%     
1988-1995 3,7%  -2,6%  3,3%  3,7% 
1982-1995  2,4%     
 
Figure 5 plots the annual values for average capital (machinery) productivity, and 
average employment productivity from our micro data and from the published aggregate 
statistics.
7 Figure 6 plots an index of total factor productivity by OP and LP 
methodologies and in order to have a sense of the cyclical movements it includes the 




                                                            
7 The high degree of volatility in annual productivity changes in the eighties is striking. After the 
November 1982 exchange rate crisis there was a large decline in manufacturing production. The decrease 
in production was larger than the net destruction of employment, hence average labor productivity fell 
significantly. In 1986 the manufacturing sector started to recover, by making use of idle capacity and 
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V.  Estimates of the Impact of Trade Liberalization on Employment and 
Capital flows and Productivity 
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As argued previously it is reasonable for the Uruguayan experience to assume that firms 
face a mainly exogenous shift in trade policy towards lower tariffs. Additionally, 
although we take unionization to be endogenous, we will assume that the changes in 
negotiation regimes arising out of changes in government participation in the 
negotiations process are also exogenous to both firms and unions. Firms and unions 
adapt their behavior in the face of the disappearance of the incentives to negotiate at a 
centralized level. As a result, changes were induced in several parameters of firms and 
unions behavior: the scope of negotiations (bargaining over employment vs. over 
wages), and finally, the very incentives for union activity were weakened, as is probably 
reflected in the ever decreasing affiliation rates through the period. 
 
There are three channels through which trade policy is expected to affect  factor flows 
and productivity at a firm level. First, the foreign input push may imply for firms the 
access to a better or cheaper pool of intermediate inputs and capital goods, implying 
therefore capital creation, job destruction and higher total factor productivity. Naturally, 
unions will resist capital for labor substitution, hence we will expect that the presence of 
unions will mitigate (or eliminate) the magnitude of this effect. Second, a competitive 
push will imply that the fiercer competition will force firms to innovate, hence 
productivity gains are to be expected. Two extreme cases of this will be, on the one 
hand, that in which higher productivity is passed on in higher factor payments with 
factor quantities fixed, and in the other hand, that in which we observe both capital and 
job creation. Third, the competitive elimination process may induce exit of the least 
productive firms. Productivity at a sector level increases since there remain only the 
most productive firms. The capital and jobs of exiting firms are destroyed. Summing up 
all of the mentioned effects, we expect the openness measures to be associated with 
higher capital creation and capital destruction, with higher job creation and higher job 
destruction, and fundamentally, with higher total factor productivity. 
 
Unions are associated with higher wages and lower turnover but there are several 
plausible arguments that run in opposite directions on their effects on job creation, job 
destruction and productivity. Which effect dominates remains an empirical issue. 
According to Borjas and Ramey (1995) we expect trade liberalization effects to be 
lower in more competitive sectors. 
 
The preferred estimation technique is Instrumental Variables (IV) in order to control for 
endogeneity problems. We also report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations. The 
models to be estimated are specified as: 
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where  j is firm i’s sector. Size is measured as the average of current and past 
establishment value added and Death is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 the 
year previous to the firm exit. In our regressions, we control by sectoral dummies (dj), 
and we allow for fixed establishment and year effects.  
 
Op (openness) is the trade liberalization variable. It is consequently defined as the 
negative of the annual variation in the average tariff.
8 A positive estimated coefficient 
means that the greater the degree of trade liberalization, the higher the rate in 
consideration. We have data on tariffs for the period 1985-1995; therefore including two 
lags of Op the estimations are for 1988-1995. 
 
Un (union density) is defined as the affiliation rate of the industry at the 3 digit ISIC 
level. This variable is built using data on membership reported by the national 
federation of unions in each of its periodic congresses and dividing that figure by total 
employment. The bargaining centralization variable Cen is the fraction of employees in 
the sector that have agreements at sector level registered at the Ministry of Labor. Prior 
to 1985 when unions where banned and the state played no role in the bargaining 
process, this variable takes the value of 0 and for most industries it jumps to values 
close to one over the next five years. After 1991 it starts to fall due to the progressive 
conclusion of the tripartite agreements of the preceding years and the end of 
government involvement in labor bargaining.
9  
 
Con is the concentration variable. It is measured as the sum of the market share of the 
three largest establishments in the sector. It ranges from a low 6% to full 100% 
concentration with an average of 34%.  
 
To take into account the fact that union density and concentration are an endogenous 
result of several sector and firm attributes, our IV regressions instrument Un and Con, 
using bargaining centralization (Cen) and the ratio between the sales of the two largest 
firms in the sector. 
 
The dependent variables considered in equation (1) are rates and therefore capture the 
change between periods. Productivity on the other hand is a level variable and therefore  
more suitably modeled dynamically.
10 Note that our estimation strategy with respect to 
openness is different in the case of productivity than that of factor flows. Given that the 
latter are rates, we use as explanatory variables changes in tariffs, whereas because 
productivity is a level variable, we use the tariff level as a regressor in the productivity 
estimations. Therefore the model for productivity is: 
 
                                                            
8 In past versions of this paper we experiment with sector implicit tariffs (ratio of internal and external 
prices) that reflect both tariff and non-tariff protection instruments. Given that Uruguayan protectionist 
policies were mostly conducted by non-tariff instruments these implicit tariffs have an endogenity 
problem that is not present in the actual import tariff.  
9 See Cassoni, Fachola and Labadie (2001) for details on the construction of these variables. 
10 Although not reported, we also explored static specifications for productivity and dynamic 
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Tar is the average import tariff constructed at four digit ISIC aggregation level. 
Productivities and Tar are estimated in logs and therefore the coefficients can be 
directly interpreted as elasticities. A negative sign on Tar means that lowering the tariff 
(i.e. opening the economy) produces an increase in productivity.  
 
It may be that the dependent and some of the explanatory variables are simultaneously 
determined, introducing biases in the estimations. To deal with this problem, General 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimates based on instrumenting the past equation by the 
lagged level values of the variables can be used. We follow the estimation methodology 
of Arellano and Bond (1991, 1995) and use as instruments Cen, the past value of the 
independent variables and the lag 3 of the log of TFP. For completitude we also run 
OLS regressions.  
 
Tables 7 and 8 presents the econometric results for job flows and Tables 9 and 10  for 
capital flows using IV and OLS. The sets of instruments were adequate according to 
Hausman tests reported in Tables 7 and 9. 
 
As expected, the trade liberalization process implied an increase in job creation and in 
job destruction. The increase in job creation can be associated with the competitive push 
channel mentioned before. The increase in job destruction can be the effect of the 
foreign input push or the downsizing and eventual exiting of inefficient firms (the 
competitive elimination channel). The effect on job destruction is stronger than the 
effect in job creation implying therefore a negative effect of trade liberalization on net 
creation rates.  
 
Trade liberalization is also associated with higher capital destruction and marginally 
with lower capital creation. Again, the effects on capital destruction point to a 
competitive elimination channel. What is somewhat more puzzling is the negative 
coefficient on the open variable (lag 2) in the capital creation regressions. This seems 
indicative that the technological change in the Uruguayan manufacturing sector is not 
necessarily linked to sectors that experienced the highest tariff reductions. Probably 
many firms in these previously highly protected sectors were unable to survive and the 
switch towards more capital intensive technologies took place in within sectors that 
originally were more exposed to international competition. The joint result of the 
creation and destruction capital rates is that the trade liberalization overall is associated 











Unions are associated with higher net job and capital creation rates. The higher net 
creation rates in unionized sectors are the result of lower destruction rates. Unions 
seems to have implied lower destruction rates for both labor and capital but no effects 
on creation rates. In that sense unions were able to ameliorate the competitive channel 
elimination of trade liberalization, and by not exiting, more unionized firms had lower 
destruction of capital and labor.  
 
Allen (1988) finds that while in the private sector existence of unions increases layoffs, 
unions  reduce layoffs in the public sector. Our establishment database is composed 
only of private firms and although we do not measure layoffs explicitly the job 
destruction pattern associated with unions seems to show a different picture.  
 
With respect to firms market power, higher concentration mitigates the openness effect 
on job and capital destruction. We do not find an effect on creation rates of industry 
concentration. This evidence does not support the model presented in Borjas and Ramey 
(1995). 
 
Considering the marginal effects, an extra point import tariff reduction has a direct 
effect that increases the destruction rate by half percentage point (0.53). This effect is 
mitigated by the presence of unions and degree of concentration. Evaluating the 
marginal effect at the average unions density, one point reduction in tariffs produces an 
increase on the destruction rate of only 0.11. Considering also the average concentration 
the destruction rate increases only by 0.02.  Similarly the reduction of one extra point 
has a direct effect of reducing the net creation rate by -0.80. But once we account for the 
presence of unions the marginal effect is a reduction of about -0.13 and adding the 
effects of market power the final marginal effect is of only -0.02. The marginal effect of 
trade liberalization on job creation is 0.01. Although small in magnitude, this figure 
hides a different effect on blue and white collars. While a marginal increase in 
international exposure increases blue collar job creation rate by 0.01, it decreases white 
collar job creation rate by 0.17. 
 
It does not seems to be a significant difference in the way unions effect white and blue 
collars. The direct marginal effect of trade liberalization on white collars and blue 
collars net creation is about -0.54 and -0.57 respectively. Once we account for the 
mitigating effects on unions these effects are reduced to -0.09 and -0.10. Finally the 
complete marginal effects accounting for unions and concentration is of -0.01 and -0.02. 
Thus, we do no find evidence of  trade liberalization affecting white and blue collars in 
a differentiated way neither the mitigating effects of unions is different for blue and 
white collar workers.  
 
With respect to capital, the direct marginal effect of the reduction of an extra point in 
tariffs is a decrease in the net creation rate of 0.41. The presence of unions 
fundamentally but also industry concentration mitigate the effects of the higher 
international exposure. The effect of trade liberalization considering the direct effect 
and the interaction with unions is of a much smaller reduction in the net creation rate of 
0.07. Considering also the average industry concentration, the marginal effect of trade 










mostly channeled trough higher destruction. The very small -but not of the expected 
sign- marginal effect of trade liberalization on capital creation is -0.01. 
 
The estimated coefficient for Death was found to be significant and negative in most 
flow rate regressions. Establishments in their last year before exiting tend to create less 
employment and capital and also to destroy less. The former is intuitively appealing, 
while the latter is somewhat strange. We conjecture that a manager who already 
anticipated the death of the establishment may have found it cheaper to close the firm 
all at one than to gradually reduce employment and capital in the period leading up to 
closure.  
 
As was found in previous studies (for instance Davis, Haltiwanger and Shuh (1996)) 
larger establishments have higher net creation rates. In the Uruguayan manufacturing 
case larger firms tend to have lower creation and lower destruction rates but the effect 
on the latter is stronger. This results holds for all types of employment and capital. In 











Table 7. Job Flows Regressions 
IV estimation 
  Total Employment  White Collars  Blue Collars 
   Net Creation  Destruct. Net Creation  Destruct. Net Creation  Destruct. 
Op  -0,025 0,007 0,023 -0,017 0,009 0,018 -0,020 0,006 0,017 
   (0.009)***  (0.003)***  (0.007)***  (0.006)***  (0.005)*  (0.009)**  (0.007)***  (0.003)**  (0.007)** 
Op(-1)  -0,760 -0,055 0,492 -0,513 -0,228 0,529 -0,541 -0,058 0,396 
   (0.369)**  (0,057)  (0.202)**  (0.173)***  (0.134)*  (0.245)**  (0.291)*  (0,066)  (0.185)** 
Op(-2)  -0,015 0,001 0,012 -0,009 -0,001 0,024 -0,013 0,002 0,010 
    (0.007)** (0,003)  (0.007)*  (0,006)  (0,006) (0.011)**  (0.006)** (0,004)  (0,006) 
UnOp(-1)  1,690 0,099 -1,062 1,151 0,442 -1,189 1,202 0,101 -0,857 
   (0.811)**  (0,129)  (0.435)**  (0.388)***  (0,274)  (0.545)**  (0.639)*  (0,146)  (0.399)** 
ConOp(-1)  0,371 0,048 -0,283 0,244 0,170 -0,231 0,262 0,053 -0,217 
   (0.198)*  (0,034)  (0.133)**  (0.093)***  (0.092)*  (0.134)*  (0.158)*  (0,044)  (0.116)* 
Death  0,765 -0,143 -0,795 0,741 0,076 -0,808 0,686 -0,080 -0,726 
    (0.101)***  (0.052)***  (0.080)***  (0.068)*** (0,105) (0.107)***  (0.081)*** (0,065) (0.064)*** 
Size  0,101 -0,025 -0,141 0,120 -0,006 -0,161 0,097 -0,031 -0,153 
    (0.016)***  (0.008)***  (0.018)***  (0.014)*** (0,014) (0.023)***  (0.014)***  (0.009)***  (0.017)*** 
Constant  -0,196 0,164 0,547 -0,265 0,356 0,729 -0,213 0,275 0,644 
    (0.060)*** (0.022)*** (0.059)*** (0.044)*** (0.042)*** (0.090)*** (0.051)*** (0.027)*** (0.056)*** 
Observations  5536 1929 2883 5220 1550 2126 5455 1836 2802 
Establishments  1155 834 1018  1101 723  896 1141 818 1005 
Hausman  test  0,793 0,990 0,669 0,407 0,923 0,804 0,878 0,965 0,801 
Note: Op=Change in tariff level,  Un=affiliation rate at 3 digit ISIC, Con=concentration rate at 3 digit ISIC, UnOp=Un*Op, 
ConOp=Con*Op, Death= dummy takes value 1 the year previous the establishment exits, Size=average of current and 
past value added. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
Table 8. Job Flows Regressions 
OLS estimation 
  Total Employment  White Collars  Blue Collars 
   Net Creation  Destruct. Net Creation  Destruct. Net Creation  Destruct. 
Op  -0,010 0,007 0,013 -0,007 0,009 0,008 -0,010 0,007 0,009 
   (0.003)***  (0.002)***  (0.004)***  (0.004)*  (0.004)**  (0,006)  (0.003)***  (0.003)**  (0.004)** 
Op(-1)  -0,046 -0,014 0,049 -0,051 -0,023 0,055 -0,042 -0,016 0,039 
    (0.010)*** (0.008)*  (0.014)***  (0.012)*** (0,015) (0.019)***  (0.010)*** (0.010)* (0.014)*** 
Op(-2)  -0,007 0,002 0,009 -0,004 -0,001 0,012 -0,007 0,003 0,007 
    (0.004)**  (0,003) (0.005)* (0,004) (0,005) (0.007)*  (0.004)* (0,004)  (0,005) 
UnOp(-1)  0,110 0,021 -0,127 0,119 0,040 -0,134 0,098 0,022 -0,104 
    (0.021)*** (0,017) (0.032)***  (0.026)*** (0,030) (0.042)***  (0.022)*** (0,021) (0.031)*** 
ConOp(-1)  0,010 0,015 0,003 0,024 0,029 -0,012 0,008 0,019 0,001 
    (0,013) (0,011) (0,019) (0,016) (0,019) (0,024) (0,014) (0,014) (0,018) 
Death  0,607 -0,150 -0,686 0,637 0,017 -0,674 0,582 -0,094 -0,675 
    (0.036)***  (0.048)***  (0.050)***  (0.045)*** (0,086) (0.065)***  (0.040)*** (0,060) (0.050)*** 
Size  0,101 -0,026 -0,149 0,119 -0,013 -0,174 0,097 -0,032 -0,160 
    (0.010)***  (0.008)***  (0.014)***  (0.012)*** (0,012) (0.018)***  (0.011)***  (0.009)***  (0.014)*** 
Constant  -0,284 0,164 0,621 -0,323 0,350 0,848 -0,275 0,272 0,706 
    (0.025)*** (0.021)*** (0.038)*** (0.032)*** (0.037)*** (0.053)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.038)*** 
Observations  5551 1938 2886 5233 1555 2127 5470 1846 2806 
Establishments  1155 836 1019  1101 725  896 1141 819 1006 












Table 9. Capital Flows Regressions 
IV estimation 
   Total Capital  Machinery  Other Capital 
   Net Creation  Destruct. Net Creation  Destruct. Net Creation  Destruct. 
Op  -0,022 -0,003 0,022 -0,024 -0,008  0,019 -0,021 -0,006  0,012 
    (0.004)*** (0,004) (0.004)***  (0.005)*** (0,005) (0.003)***  (0.005)*** (0,004) (0.004)*** 
Op(-1)  -0,374 -0,040 0,064 -0,332 0,006  0,092 -0,257 -0,055 0,048 
    (0.139)*** (0,101) (0.032)**  (0.141)** (0,047) (0.028)***  (0.137)*  (0,088)  (0,031) 
Op(-2)  -0,018 -0,007 0,019 -0,022 -0,013  0,020 -0,015 -0,006  0,017 
    (0.005)***  (0.004)*  (0.005)*** (0.005)***  (0.007)**  (0.004)*** (0.005)***  (0,005)  (0.005)*** 
UnOp(-1)  0,871 0,104 -0,139 0,799 0,027 -0,213 0,621 0,166 -0,065 
    (0.310)*** (0,234) (0.066)**  (0.331)** (0,095) (0.059)***  (0.311)** (0,205)  (0,066) 
ConOp(-1)  0,141 0,001 -0,007 0,084 -0,044 -0,014 0,077 -0,019 -0,053 
    (0.076)* (0,047) (0,043) (0,062) (0,051) (0,041) (0,070) (0,046) (0,043) 
Death  0,756 -0,311 -0,788 0,725 -0,226 -0,769 0,695 -0,175 -0,824 
    (0.058)***  (0.092)***  (0.042)***  (0.062)*** (0.128)* (0.039)***  (0.060)***  (0.082)** (0.043)*** 
Size  0,106 -0,003 -0,171 0,115 0,002 -0,135 0,104 -0,010 -0,170 
    (0.013)*** (0,011) (0.016)***  (0.013)*** (0,016) (0.013)***  (0.013)*** (0,012) (0.016)*** 
Constant  -0,132 0,316 0,384 -0,157 0,421  0,365 -0,126 0,408  0,472 
    (0.038)*** (0.037)*** (0.034)*** (0.040)*** (0.054)*** (0.030)*** (0.039)*** (0.036)*** (0.036)*** 
Observations  4114 1526 2588 3979 1159 2816 4044 1647 2397 
Establishments  704 537 671 678 468 663 689 562 659 
Hausman  test  0,384 0,999 0,980 0,582 0,985 0,373 0,842 0,822 0,880 
Note: Op=Change in tariff level,  Un=affiliation rate at 3 digit ISIC, Con=concentration rate at 3 digit ISIC, UnOp=Un*Op, 
ConOp=Con*Op, Death= dummy takes value 1 the year previous the establishment exits, Size=average of current and 
past value added. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 10. Capital Flows Regressions 
OLS estimation 
   Total Capital  Machinery  Other Capital 
   Net Creation  Destruct. Net Creation  Destruct. Net Creation  Destruct. 
Op  -0,015 -0,003 0,021 -0,016 -0,007  0,017 -0,015 -0,004  0,013 
    (0.003)*** (0,003) (0.004)***  (0.003)*** (0,005) (0.003)***  (0.003)*** (0,004) (0.004)*** 
Op(-1)  -0,03 -0,006 0,042 -0,038 0,014  0,041 -0,025 -0,008 0,029 
    (0.010)*** (0,011) (0.012)***  (0.011)*** (0,017) (0.010)***  (0.011)**  (0,013)  (0.012)** 
Op(-2)  -0,014 -0,007 0,019 -0,018 -0,013  0,018 -0,012 -0,004  0,019 
    (0.004)*** (0.004)* (0.005)***  (0.004)*** (0.007)* (0.004)***  (0.004)*** (0,005)  (0.005)*** 
UnOp(-1)  0,075 0,023 -0,075 0,079 -0,016 -0,07  0,075  0,01  -0,06 
    (0.021)*** (0,024) (0.027)***  (0.023)*** (0,036) (0.023)***  (0.024)*** (0,026)  (0.027)** 
ConOp(-1)  0,006 -0,008 -0,014 0,018 -0,017 -0,022 -0,005 0,019 0,001 
    (0,013) (0,015) (0,016) (0,014) (0,024) (0,014) (0,015) (0,017) (0,016) 
Death  0,672 -0,326 -0,781 0,645 -0,236 -0,755 0,637 -0,202 -0,828 
    (0.039)***  (0.081)***  (0.041)***  (0.043)*** (0.126)* (0.038)***  (0.045)***  (0.076)***  (0.042)*** 
Size  0,106 -0,004 -0,171 0,113 0,002 -0,135 0,104 -0,014 -0,172 
    (0.011)*** (0,011) (0.016)***  (0.012)*** (0,016) (0.013)***  (0.012)*** (0,011) (0.016)*** 
Constant  -0,178  0,312 0,39 -0,205 0,42 0,378 -0,16 0,402 0,465 
    (0.028)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)*** (0.030)*** (0.053)*** (0.029)*** (0.031)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** 
Observations  4127 1533 2594 3991 1168 2823 4056 1653 2403 
Establishments  704 538 672 678 474 663 689 562 660 











Table 11 presents the results for productivity estimated using a GMM and OLS 
approach respectively. The Sargan tests show that the three models have adequate 
instruments in the three models. Tar, Un, Death and Size were found to be significant at 
high levels and had the expected sign. 
 
The negative sign on the Tar variable implies that trade liberalization is associated with 
increases in employment and capital average productivity and with total factor 
productivity. This result is qualitatively similar to López-Cordoba (2002) for a panel of 
Mexican firms. His main findings are that increased foreign competition and access to 
the US market have a positive impact on total factor productivity. 
 
Consistent with mitigating effects on unions on the trade liberalization factor flows 
consequences, the coefficient of the interaction between union density and tariffs was 
found to be positive. This means that unions reduced the productivity enhancing 
resulting from the higher international exposition. This result is not in line with 
Freeman and Medoff "organizational view" and closer to those that stress the monopoly 
costs of unions.  
 
The steady state elasticities of the three productivity measures with respect to the tariff 
level are between 0.4 and 1 -and additional 1% decrease in tariffs produces an increase 
in productivities between 0.4% and 1%. Without considering the mitigating effect of 
unions, the employment productivity elasticity with respect to tariff is of -0.53. Once the 
interaction with unions is accounted this elasticity is reduces to -0.43. Similarly for 
capital productivity and TFP, unions reduce in absolute value the productivity elasticity 
with respect to import tariffs by 0.1 (from 1.02 to 0.93 for capital productivity and from 
-0.86 to -0.76 for TFP).  
 
In our IV estimation the Death variable was not significant for employment productivity 
and TFP. Therefore, it can not be assured that exiting firms had lower productivity. On 
the contrary Aw, Chen and Roberts (1997) for Taiwanese manufacturing firms find that 
exiting firms are less productive than survivors. Our OLS estimation produce this result. 
 
With respect to industry concentration, we do not find evidence that the productivity 
improvements vary across different industry concentration levels. Finally, larger firms 























Table 12. Productivity 
  
   GMM estimation  OLS estimation 
   Employment  Capital   TFP  Employment  Capital   TFP 
   Productivity Productivity    (LP)  Productivity  Productivity  (LP) 
lag 1 dependent variable  0,213  0,335  0,224  0,17  0,326  0,177 
    (0,073)*** (0,060)***  (0,088)*** (0.016)***  (0.017)*** (0.020)*** 
Tar -0,030  -0,034  -0,025  0,137  0,225  0,116 
   (0,107) (0,106)  (0,096)  (0.056)**  (0.069)***  (0.064)* 
Tar(-1) -0,416  -0,440  -0,331  -0,378  -0,143  -0,253 
    (0,139)*** (0,171)***  (0,142)*** (0.091)***  (0,112)  (0.102)** 
Tar(-2) -0,180  -0,241  -0,336  -0,013  0,049  -0,12 
   (0,127)  (0,144)**  (0,133)***  (0,085)  (0,105)  (0,095) 
UnTar(-1) 0,201  0,155  0,259  0,21  0,277  0,326 
   (0.072)***  (0.079)**  (0,073)***  (0.052)***  (0.067)***  (0.061)*** 
ConTar(-1) -0,064  -0,012  -0,112  -0,018  -0,248  -0,113 
    (0,088) (0,106)  (0,092) (0,045) (0.067)***  (0.060)* 
Death -0,086  -0,250  -0,066  -0,132  -0,297  -0,132 
    (0,082) (0,101)***  (0,080) (0.044)*** (0.056)***  (0.051)*** 
Size 0,117  0,152  0,099  0,081  0,114  0,081 
    (0,027)*** (0,031)***  (0,025)*** (0.010)***  (0.015)*** (0.013)*** 
Constant -0,057  -0,132  -0,076  7,241  -0,225  4,889 
   (0,034)**  (0,036)***  (0,032)***  (0.184)***  (0,170)  (0.189)*** 
Observations 2.113  2.109  2.022  5.358  3.675  3.241 
Establishments  532 531  508  1.076 680 618 
Sargan test  0,524  0,326  0,272          
Test no autocorreleation order 1  0,000  0,000  0,000          
Test no autocorreleation order 2  0,381  0,241  0,136          
Note: The dependent variable is the log of productivity. Tar= log of the tariff level, Un=affiliation rate at  3 digit ISIC, Con=concentration rate 
at 3 digit ISIC, UnTar=Un*Tariff, , ConTar=Con*Tar, Death= dummy takes value 1 the year previous the establishment exits, Size=average of 






In this paper we study employment and capital flows and productivity in the Uruguayan 
manufacturing sector using a panel of establishment level data between 1982 and 1995. 
Creation and destruction rates were found to be relatively high and pervasive over time. 
Even during the strong net employment destruction process experienced during the 
nineties, annual creation rates are above 4%. Although white and blue collar 
employment evolution is not the same over time, the previous results hold true for both 
of them.   
 
The Uruguayan manufacturing sector, in response to reductions in trade barriers, 
undertook a technological update in favor of more capital intensive technologies. The 
use of such technologies brought about a progressive and systematic increase in the 
average labor productivities, though not in capital productivity. Concurrently total factor 










competition through tariff reductions, and the availability of cheaper and better 
intermediate inputs and capital goods may be behind that higher productivity. Although 
we suggest plausible channels, definitive testing on alternative explanations remains an  
interesting issue for further research. 
 
Though the opening of the Uruguayan economy implied both the creation and 
destruction of jobs, overall there were very high net destruction rates. These net 
destruction rates are explained mainly by the downsizing and exiting of less efficient 
firms. We find no evidence of a differentiated effect on the net creation of jobs for blue 
collar and white collar workers.  
 
Unions acted as buffers on the effects of higher international exposure. They were able 
to mitigate the effects of the competitive elimination channel with respect to net 
creation rates. Although not creating more jobs, unionized sectors are associated with 
lower destruction rates. It does not seem to be a different pattern for blue and white 
collar workers in this respect either. The same pattern observed for capital dynamics. 
The other side of this story is that the mitigating effects of unions negatively affected 
the increase in productivity brought by the liberalization process.  
 
More concentrated sectors were also able to ameliorate -but in a much lower magnitude 
than unions did- the effects of higher international exposure on job dynamics but they 
had very small or no effect at all in capital dynamics. Productivity dynamics were not 
affected by industry concentration either.  
 
With respect to firms size, we found that larger firms have higher net creation rates. We 
found no evidence of a different pattern of creation between larger and smaller firms, 
but larger firms tend to have lower destruction rates. Larger firms were also found to be 
more productive.  
 
Summing up, Uruguay opened its economy in the presence of strong –at least initially- 
unions and structural different industry concentration levels. Higher international 
exposure implied a slightly higher job creation and an important increase in job and 
capital destruction. Unions were able to ameliorate this effect. Although not associated 
with higher creation rates, unions were effective in reducing job and capital destruction. 
Industry concentration also was found to mitigate the destruction of jobs but had no 
effect on job creation nor in capital dynamics. The changes in the use of labor and 
capital brought an increase in total factor productivity specially in sectors where tariff 
reductions were larger and unions were not present. We found no evidence of varying 














Aidt, T. and Z. Tzannatos (2002) “Unions and Collective Bargaining. Economic Effects in a 
Global Environment”  Washington, D.C. The World Bank.  
 
Allen, S (1988) “Unions and Job Security in the Public Sector” in R. Freeman  and C 
Ichniowski,(eds) When Public Sector Workers Unionize, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.  
 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991) “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an Application to Employment Situations”, Review of Economic Studies, 58: 277-
297. 
 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1995) PONER ESTA CITA 
 
Arimón, G. and Torello, M. (1997) “Productividad total de factores: revisión metodológica y 
una aplicación al sector manufacturero uruguayo”, CEPAL Montevideo, Doc. 
LC/MVD/R.129.Rev.2 
 
Aw, B., Chen, Y and Roberts, M. (1997), “Firm level evidence on productivity differentials, 
turnover and exports in Taiwanese manufacturing”, NBER working paper 6325, 1997. 
 
Baily, M, Hulten, C. and Campbell, D. (1992), “Productivity dynamics in manufacturing 
plants”, Brookings Papers in Economic Activity, Microeconomics 1992. 
 
Ben David, D. “Equalizing Exchange: Trade Liberalization and Income Convergence”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3):653-79. 
 
Black S. and L. Lynch (1997) “How to compete: the impact of workplace practices and 
information technology on productivity” Working Paper 6120, NBER. 
 
Boal W an J. Pencavel (1994) “The Effects of Labor Unions onEmployment, Wages and Days 
of Operation: Coal Mining in West Virginia” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 267-98 
 
Borjas, G. and V. Ramey “Foreign Competition, Market Power and Wage Inequality” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 1075-1110. 
 
Brunello, G. (1992) “The Effect of Unions on Firms in Japanese Manufacturing”, Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, 45:471-487. 
 
Butcher, K and C. Rouse (2001) “Wage Effects of Unions and Industrial Council in South 
Africa” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 54:349-374. 
 
Caballero, R., E. Engel and J. Haltiwanger (1997) “Aggregate employment dynamics: building 
from microeconomic evidence”, American Economic Review 87 (1): 115-137. 
 
Cassoni, A, G. Fachola and G. Labadie (2001)  “The Economic Effects of Unions in Latin 
America: Their Impact on Wages and the Economic Performance of Firms in Uruguay” 
unpublished paper Inter American Development Bank. 
 
Cassoni, A., Labadie, G. (2001) “The outcome of different bargaining models: the effects on 










de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Uruguay 
 
Denny, K and S. Nickell (1991) “Unions and Investment in British Manufacturing Industry” 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 29:113-22 
 
Davis, S. and J. Haltiwanger (1992) “Gross job creation, gross job destruction and employment 
reallocation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (3): 819-863. 
 
Davis, S. and J. Haltiwanger and S. Schuh (1996) Job Creation and Destruction MIT Press.  
 
Dunne, T. M. Roberts and L. Samuelson (1989), “Plant turnover and gross employment flows in 
the U.S. manufacturing sector”, Journal of Labor Economics 7 (1): 48-71. 
 
Forteza, A. (1991), “Los convenios salariales y la inflación”. Documentos de trabajo, 
Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Uruguay 
 
Freeman, R and Kleiner (1990) “The Impact of New Unionization on Wages and Working 
Conditions” Journal of Labor Economics (81):8-25 
 
Freeman, R, and Medoff, J. (1983), “Trade unions and productivity: some new evidence on an 
old issue”, NBER working paper 1249. 
 
PONER FREMAN (80) Y FREEMAN Y MEDOFF (79, 84) 
 
Grout, P. (1984) “Investment an Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts” Economica 52(4) 
449-60 
 
INE (1996) “Metodología: Encuesta Industrial. Base 1988” Instituto Nacional de Estadística.  
 
Keller, W. “Do Trade Patterns and Technology Flows Affect Productivity Growth?”, World 
Bank Economic Review 14(1):17-47. 
 
Kim, E. “Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth in Korean Manufactuirng Industries: 
Price Protection, Market Power and Scale Efficiency”, Journal of Development Economics 
62(1): 55-83. 
 
Kuhn, P (1998) “Unions and the economy: what we know; what we should know” Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 31(5),1033-1056. 
 
Levinsohn, J. (1999) “Employment responses to international liberalization in Chile” Journal of 
International Economics 47: 21-344 
 
Levinsohn, J. and A. Petrin (2000) “Estimating production functions using inputs to control for 
unobservables” Working Paper 7819 NBER.  
 
López-Córdova, E. (2002), “NAFTA and Mexico’s manufacturing productivity: an empirical 
investigation using micro-level data”. Presented at the LACEA Madrid meeting, October 2002. 
 
Malcomson, J. (1983) “Trade Unions and Economic Efficiency” Economic Journal 93: 52-65. 
 










Review , 71, 896-908. 
 
Muendler, M. (2002), “Trade, technology and productivity; a study of Brazilian manufacturers 
1986-1998”, mimeo, University of California at Berkeley. 
 
Olley, G. and Pakes, A. (1996), “The dynamics of productivity in the telecommunications 
equipment industry”, Econometrica, 64, 1263-1297. 
 
Park, Y. (1991) “Union/Non-union Wage Differentials in the Korean Manufacturing Sector” 
International Economic Journal 5(4):70-91. 
 
Pencavel, J. (1995) “The Role of Labor Unions in Fostering Economic Development” Policy 
Research Working Paper Nº1469, World Bank.  
 
Pavcnik, N. (2002) “Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvements: Evidence from 
Chilean Plants” Review of Economics Studies, 69,245-276. 
 
Picardo, S. And Z. Ferre (2003) “Indice de precios para deflactar insumos en la industria 
manufacturera, 1982-1999”, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, 
Universidad de la República. 
  
Rama, M. (1994) “The labor market and trade reform in manufacturing” in M. Connolly and J. 
De Melo eds., The Effects of Protectionism on a Small Country: The Case of Uruguay. The 
World Bank. 
 
Rama, M and G. Tabellini (1998) “Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor 
Market Policies” European Economic Review, 42(7): 1295-1316. 
 
Rees, A. (1963) “The Effects of Unions on Resource Allocation” Journal of Law and 
Economics, 6, 69-78. 
 
Rodríguez, J. M., Cozzano, Mazzucchi and Pozzolo (1998), “Las relaciones laborales en el 
Uruguay”.  
 
Sachs, J. and W. A. Werner “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration”, 
Brookings Papers in Economic Activity1995(1), 1-118. 
 
Standing, G. (1992) “Do Unions Impede or Accelerate Structural Adjustment? Industrial versus 
Company Unions in an Industrializing Labour Market” Cambrigde Journal of Economics 16: 
327-54. 
 
Tybout, J. (2001), “Plant and firm level evidence on “new” trade theories”, NBER working 
paper 8418. 
 
Tansini, R. and P. Triunfo (1999) “Cambio tecnológico y productividad de las empresas 
industriales uruguayas”. Revista de Economía del Banco Central del Uruguay, Segunda época, 
6(2):161-209.  
 
Vaillant, M (2000) “Limits to trade liberalization: a political economy approach”, Ph.d. 










Appendix - Productivity Estimation  
 
 
A.1.  Olley and Pakes’ method 
 
Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation of total factor productivity is based on a model in which 
firms have at the beginning of every period a set of decisions to make, including whether to 
continue or not in operation. If the firm decides to continue, it must choose levels of variable 
inputs and investment. Technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function  
 
yit = β0 +  βkkit + βlw lwit + βmm it + βlblbit + ωit + ηit      
 
where kit is capital input,  lwit is white collar labor input, lbit is blue collar labor mit is material 
inputs, ωit is TFP (unobserved by the researcher), all in logs, and ηit can be thought of either as 
an non-forecastable shock or as measurement error. The model generates an exit rule, 
represented by an indicator function χt in which survival depends on ωit exceeding a certain 
threshold. Pakes (1994) showed that the solution to the optimizing firm’s problem yields an 
investment equation of the form: 
iit = i(kit  , ωit) 
 
  which is monotonically increasing in ωit  and therefore invertible.  The TFP is then 
() it it t it i k h , = ω  and substituting back in the production function we obtain: 
 
yit = βlw lwit + βlblbit + βmm it + ωit + φt(kit  , iit) + ηit  
where  
φit(kit  , iit)= β0 + βkkit + ht(,kit  , iit) 
 
Estimation of the last equation only identifies βlw, βlb, and   βm  and in order to identify βk 
estimates of the probability of survival must be obtained. Probability of survival next period is 
given by 
P {χt+1= 1} = π (kit  , iit)= Pit 
 
Writing the expectation  
 
E [yit+1 - βl lit+1   | ait+1, kit+1, χt+1= 1 ]= β0 + βkkit+1 + E[ ωit+1 | ωit, χt+1= 1] 
 
leads to the estimated equation: 
 
yit+1 - βlw lwit - βlblbit - βmm it  =  βkkit+1 + g( Pit, φit - βkkit) + ξit+1 + ηit+1 
 
The first stage of the estimation requires the estimation of φt and of the probabilities of survival. 
Hence we generate polynomial terms (of order four) in investment and capital stock and obtain 
regression estimates of the predicted values of the log of output in an equation having on the 
right hand side the labor inputs (blue and white collar jobs), raw materials inputs, the 
polynomial (fourth degree) terms and year and two digit industry dummies. 
 
We also compute the probabilities of survival (Pit) by running a logit regression in the 
polynomial terms, along with industry and year dummies.   
 
Finally, using the estimates of βlw, ,  βlb, and βm of φt and the probabilities of survival and 
substituting them in the last equation we can obtain an estimate of βk by running non linear least 











where   
it k it it k h β ϕ
! ! !
− =  
 
We can therefore reconstruct establishment level total factor productivity from the production 
function. Since for invertibility we have to use only positive levels of investment, this leads to a 
loss of a significant amount of observations.  
 
 
A.2.  Levinsohn and Petrin’s method 
 
We also performed an alternative estimation of total factor productivity, using the algorithm 
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2002). The Levinsohn-Petrin approach is similar in spirit to 
that of Olley and Pakes, except for the fact that it uses intermediate inputs rather than 
investment to proxy for the unobserved productivity shock. The intermediate input demand 
function (increasing in productivity) is: 
mit = m(kit  , ωit) 
 
Invertibility  guarantees that  ωit = ωit (kit  , mit) and substituting in the production function 
expression we obtain 
 
yit = βlw lwit + βlblbit + φt(kit  , mit) + ηit   
where  
φit(kit , mit)= β0 + βkkit +  βmm it + ht(kit  , mit) 
 
This equation is partially linear. To identify the coefficients in lw, lb, we estimate the following 
conditional moments using nonparametric methods: 
 
E[yit | kit , mit ],  E[lwit | kit , mit ],  E[lbit | kit , mit ] 
 
then we can write  
 
yit - E[yit | kit , mit ] = βlw {lwit  - E[lwit | kit , mit ]} + βlb {lbit - E[lbit | kit , mit ]}t + ηit 
 
and use non intercept OLS to estimate the coefficients in lw, lb. 
 
Then, we generate φit 
it lu it lw it it lu lw y β β ϕ
! ! ! − − =  
and compute a non parametric estimate of  ) , ( it it it k m E ϕ !
 
 
A key assumption is that the productivity shock ωit follows a first order Markov process, hence   
 
ωit = E(ωit | ωit-1) + ξit 
 
where ξit is the “news” in the transmitted shock. 
Starting form a pair of candidate values for  m k β β   and   , denoted by 
* *, m k β β
! !
 obtained from 
OLS estimation, we can compute  
∑∑
−
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[] it it t t it m it k it lu it lw it E m k lu lw y η ξ ω ω β β β β + = − − − − − − 1
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for which we need an estimate of  E(ωit | ωit-1)  
 
We use that 





then we compute our objective function, 
which we minimize, using a grid search, over βk , βm. 
 
Once the full set of parameters of the production function is estimated, we can recover 
establishment level TFP from them. 
 
 
A.3.  Consistency checks (Levinsohn and Petrin) 
 
Two consistency checks were performed in order to test the plausibility of our 
estimates. First, an increasing relationship between our proxy variable (in this case, electricity) 
and our estimates of the TFP (conditional on machinery and equipment capital) has to be 
observed. This can be seen to hold in Figure 7.  
 
 
Second, the estimation must be robust to the particular choice of proxy that is used. We 
performed the same estimation using fuel consumption to proxy for unobserved productivity 
shocks, and found our estimates (not reported) not to differ significantly to those obtained with 
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